Mr President,
I would like to thank Under-Secretary-General Rosemary di Carlo, Ambassador Frazier and Ambassador Lambrinidis for their statements.
Switzerland is disappointed and concerned about the state of implementation of Resolution 2231 and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). It was however rightly considered a success of multilateral diplomacy in the service of non-proliferation in 2015.
Switzerland has repeatedly expressed its deep concern about both the withdrawal of the
United States from the JCPoA and the various measures taken by Iran. In particular, Switzerland deplores the fact that, despite the willingness shown by most of the parties to negotiate a rapid return to the JCPoA in 2021, no progress has been made.
We still face the risk of a regional conflagration. Maintaining this important element of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and of international security would nevertheless be in our common interest. Consequently, rapid and full implementation by all parties of their obligations is imperative and urgent. All the more so as the Termination Day of Resolution 2231 is just over a year away, in October 2025.
The revival of the prospect of implementing Resolution 2231 and returning to the JCPOA depends on the following three aspects:
Firstly, the latest report from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) raises many questions about the overall increase in Iran's stocks of enriched uranium, the installation of new centrifuges and the difficulties encountered by the Agency in verifying Iran's nuclear programme. However, in order to reassure the international community of the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme, the Iranian authorities must cooperate rigorously, transparently and unequivocally with the IAEA. More than a year after the joint declaration of 4 March 2023, no progress has been made, which is very disappointing. The commitments made under this agreement, under the JCPOA and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, must be fully respected by Iran without delay.
Secondly, we are particularly concerned by substantiated indications of the transfer of drones from Iran to third countries, such as Russia and Yemen, and of ballistic missiles to the latter. We underline that until 18 October 2023, any transfer of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology contained in the Missile Technology Control Regime list constituted a violation of Resolution 2231. Recent developments in the region underline the extent to which such transfers can contribute to the escalation of conflicts. We also regret Iran's development and testing of ballistic missiles, which are incompatible with Resolution 2231.
Finally, the state of the JCPOA reminds us that urgent diplomatic efforts are needed to avoid its complete collapse. It is not insignificant that the Secretary-General recommends nonproliferation and disarmament of nuclear weapons as a key action in his "New Agenda for Peace". It is in the negotiation and maintenance of such norms that trust, the true cornerstone of the multilateral framework, is built. We hope that talks will resume and enable the parties involved to remember the interest we all have in resolving the Iranian nuclear issue. To be sustainable, political détente must be accompanied by a return to compliance with the obligations and spirit of the JCPOA.
Mr President,
This Council must find a common voice on the issue of nuclear non-proliferation.
Switzerland, as it has done in the past by hosting critical stages in the negotiations, stands ready to facilitate any diplomatic solution aimed at maintaining the non-proliferation regime.
Thank you.